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IS PRESENCE STILL A VIABLE NAVAL MISSION?

BY

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appears to be significantly reduced. This paper argues that there remains a viable mission for naval presence, especially in view of the continuing focus of U.S. foreign policy on combating terrorism and illicit drug-trafficking. However, continued viability of naval presence will be dependent upon establishment of a policy of retaliation in the event presence forces are attacked, changing from a strategy based upon routine presence to one of intermittent presence, and greater selectivity in the employment of naval forces in a presence role.

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IS PRESENCE STILL A VIABLE NAVAL MISSION?

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

John Stuart Mill once said "our diplomacy stands for nothing when we have not a fleet to back it up."[1] It is no accident that he chose to say "fleet" and not "army" or "military force." World powers have historically used the fleet as the military arm of choice for demonstrating global reach short of war for a wide variety of reasons. These include: versatility in employment, controllability by national leaders as to whether force is actually employed, inherent mobility, capability of projecting power ashore, access to virtually all regions of the world, historical symbolism, and great endurance on station without dependence upon base access or overflight rights.[2]

The numbers seem clearly to support this observation. In their seminal treatment of the subject, Blechman and Kaplan indicated that in the period between 1945 and 1975 there were approximately 215 applications of U.S. military force in response to world crises--in over 80% of which naval forces were assigned a specific role.[3] Since 1975, the rate naval forces have been employed in response to crises appears to have in fact increased as the U.S. has asserted its global reach increasingly along the coastal littoral of the developing Third World. This trend has been in spite of an emerging international environment where the U.S. has had a reduced ability to count on basing and overflight rights or support from regional allies.[4]

In the immediate post World War II period, the U.S. Navy was able to assume a global presence mission with relative ease because of its large size (over 1000 warships), the comparative naval weakness of virtually all other countries in the world, and the ability of the U.S. through a relatively modest naval presence to affect significantly the military balance in virtually every geographical region. However, in the past two decades this U.S. naval supremacy has undergone a radical change.[5] Not only is U.S. naval supremacy strongly challenged by the Soviet Union's extensive naval build up, but the technological improvements in weapon systems provided to the developing countries of the world have made it increasingly possible for smaller ships to challenge larger ones, and land and air forces to have greater lethality against offshore naval forces.[6]

In addition, the continued use of the U.S. Navy to perform effectively in a presence role in support of U.S. diplomatic policy is hampered by perception liabilities. Navies are perceived in many Third World nations as symbols of colonialism and superpower military adventurism. At the same time, naval vessels can be perceived as prime targets for terrorist attack because of their symbolic association with U.S. policy. Terrorist attacks against forward-deployed naval forces can be an attractive method of graphically protesting U.S. foreign policy or as a means of escalating the level of violence within a regional crisis.

Even within the U.S., worldwide naval presence has become a subject for debate because of the high cost to the U.S. taxpayer of maintaining such a forward-deployed forces and the fear that naval forces invite the U.S. government to become involved in foreign wars. Concerning cost, burden sharing is the primary issue. The U.S. taxpayer sees the U.S. bearing a disproportionate share of the cost of protecting worldwide freedom of navigation and regional stability vis-a-vis our allies who are increasingly being seen as economic competitors. The fear that an aggressive Maritime Strategy might provoke a war at sea with the Soviet Union[7] has been reduced by the diminishing perception of the Soviet menace and the recent policies of less aggressive naval exercises in the vicinity of the Soviet naval operating areas. However, many Americans would still like to see a reduced worldwide naval presence and a correspondingly greater emphasis on higher domestic concerns such as the "wars" against terrorism and drug trafficking.[8]

Ironically, in a generally accepted international environment in which the threat of war with the Soviet Union is considered to be significantly diminished, the keystone naval strategic document is a product of the Cold War. The Maritime Strategy describes a "strategy" only for deterring Soviet aggression and, if deterrence fails, fighting a global conventional war with the Soviet Union to achieve war termination on favorable terms for the U.S. and its allies. The Maritime Strategy purports to articulate a strategy demonstrating the usefulness of naval forces across the entire spectrum of

conflict. However, crisis response, regional war, and nuclear war are addressed in terms of capabilities and historical incidents rather than with a strategic concept for the employment of forces.[9] Revising the Maritime Strategy to reflect the changing public perception of the post-cold war international environment, would require revision to provide at least equivalent focus on the naval response to these most-likely levels of conflict below the threshold of global war with the Soviet Union,[10] specifically focussing on the role of naval presence.

The increased emphasis on the interdiction of drug trafficking is indicative of shifting perceptions of the threat to U.S. interests. Stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. has become a national security objective, with the Department of Defense serving by law as the lead agency within the federal government for detecting and monitoring the airborne and maritime transportation of illegal drugs into the U.S. under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.[11] Yet, the Maritime Strategy makes only cursory mention of the Naval Service's response--and lists no "strategy" for carrying out the maritime portion of this security tasking.

This paper will examine the continued viability of naval forces in a presence mission in view of the changing domestic and international security environments. Potential limits on the usefulness of naval presence are addressed and, where possible, specific recommendations concerning changes in policy and

employment practices necessary to maintain the viability of forward-deployed naval forces are identified.

NAVAL SUASION

Naval forces can be used in peacetime to compel, assure, deter, or induce a desired behavior from foreign governments. Navies accomplish these functions by threatening or applying limited force through: (1) routine peacetime presence, (2) increased surveillance, (3) shows of force, or (4) the limited application of force.[12]

Historically, this process has been termed "gunboat diplomacy" and defined as "the use or threat of limited naval force by a government, short of an act of war, in order to secure an advantage or to avert loss--either in an international dispute, or against foreign nationals within the jurisdiction of their own state."[13] The basis of gunboat diplomacy is therefore the "suasion" inherent in the threat of force. Edward Luttwak developed this concept into a theory of naval suasion that categorizes the use of naval force based on the reactions of targeted nations rather than "the actions, or intents, of the deploying party."[14]

Luttwak's theory is based on the concept that "any instrument of military power that can be used to inflict damage upon an adversary, physically limit his freedom of action, or reveal his intentions may also affect his conduct, and that of any interested third parties, even if force is never actually

used."[15] Accordingly, if targeted national leadership is unaffected, the military instrument has no "suasion" value. Since suasion is based on the perceptions and interpretations of the targeted nation(s) it is "inherently unpredictable" as to its results. Not only can the naval activity be interpreted in different ways, based on cultural and political bias, it can also be counterweighted in the target nation's decision-making process by other political factors, conflicting national interests, and internal domestic pressures. Rarely will a targeted government change its policies or "behavior" solely in response to a single naval action. However, naval presence may significantly reinforce diplomatic initiatives by demonstrating U.S. military resolve and ability to use force to back up U.S. foreign policy.

When the targeted national or group leadership is affected as a result of routine naval deployments, the suasion is termed to be "latent." An example of latent suasion would be the impact the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea has on the foreign policy of Libya--just by the latent potential for violent action resident in such a force operating within close geographical proximity. This is in contrast to Libya being subject to "active suasion" to curtail public support to terrorism effected by a show of force by the Sixth Fleet in the Gulf of Sidra or air strikes from the Sixth Fleet against selected targets within Libyan territory. The presence of naval warships most commonly evoke latent suasion by "impinging on the freedom of action of adversaries" by deterring aggressive courses of action.[16] This concept of latent suasion is a basic premise

of the Maritime Strategy in that U.S. forward-deployed naval forces are seen as a highly visible means of responding rapidly in times of crisis or war and "have become standard and essential components of a global political and military order, both in their warning to would-be adversaries and adventurists and in these implied promises to friends."[17] This implied promise to friends is the assurance to allies of U.S. resolve in support of treaty obligations and of continued U.S. technological and military capability. Normally such assurances are beneficial; however, the net result can be negative if it encourages a client state (such as Israel) towards aggressive activism against neighboring states under the perceived umbrella of U.S. Sixth Fleet "protection" from Soviet and/or Arab intervention.[18]

When suasion occurs as the result of deliberate actions to evoke a specific response on the part of others--whether allies, opponents, or neutrals--the suasion is termed to be "active." For example, a redeployment of a carrier battle group to a crisis area as a "show of force," coupled with appropriate warnings designed to deter an attacker or compel the withdrawal of a belligerent occupation force, would be an exercise of active suasion if it succeeds in its intended impact on targeted decision-makers. The key as to whether this deployment is classified by Luttwak as suasion would be the result (e.g., if it is perceived to be a deterrent or compelling factor).[19] For example, the Persian Gulf oil tanker escort operation can be seen as a successful case of active suasion if it meets two tests. First, it can be classed as a successful use of "suasion" only if

the targeted nations or terrorist organizations are affected by the presence. Second, it is "active suasion" rather than "latent suasion" if the effect is the result of the specific actions of the presence, e.g., convoying the oil tankers, mine clearing operations, or retaliatory strikes.

If the naval presence lacks credibility, either in capability or by an apparent lack of political will to actually use force, then the presence is unlikely to have active suasion; however, the resident combat power of the naval force may still exert some latent suasion value by limiting the potential options of targeted decision-makers. This is not always the case. An example of a deployment that failed to exhibit any suasion value occurred during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The U.S. deployed a naval task force structured around the Enterprise (CVN-65) carrier battle group in apparent support of Pakistan against the threat of Indian aggression. However, the battle group failed to arrive in the Indian Ocean until after the outcome of the war was already decided. Even after arriving within the theater, the battle group remained in the Bay of Bengal rather than deploying to the only tactically feasible area of operations--the North Indian Ocean along the coast of West Pakistan--to provide air cover against any Indian attempt to expand the war from the East Pakistan (Bangladesh) frontier to that of West Pakistan. Credibility of the task force was further degraded by the existence of two Soviet surface action groups in the area which effectively neutralized any threat of U.S. involvement by the implication that if the U.S. task force became engaged in support

of Pakistan the Soviets would enter the conflict in support of India. Finally, U.S. involvement in Vietnam and very obvious peripheral interest in the region provided the Soviets were not involved, significantly degraded the credibility of U.S. resolve in using force to support Pakistan.[20] Accordingly, the U.S. deployment, though an apparent attempt at active suasion, had no discernible effect on the decisions of any party in the crisis and would therefore fail the basic test for suasion.

In contrast, an example of a battle group deployment asserting active suasion occurred in 1978 in response to Idi Amin's threatened retention of 300 U.S. citizens within Uganda. A U.S. naval task force was ordered to a station off the coast of East Africa. The deployment of these warships, with their implied threat of U.S. military force, backed U.S. diplomatic measures through third parties and was likely effective in compelling Idi Amin to release the detained Americans.[21]

A key aspect of both latent and active suasion concerns the symbolic power of naval warships beyond their actual destructive warfighting capacity. An example is the 1946 deployment of the battleship Missouri (BB-63) to carry the body of a deceased Turkish ambassador from Washington to Istanbul. The Missouri was the most powerful warship in the world and the symbol of allied victory over Japan; however, the Soviet threat to Turkey was of invasion and the battleship would have had little actual impact on the balance of forces between the two nations, and thus provided no latent suasion on either nation. However this gesture was designed to symbolize U.S. willingness to replace the

British as guarantors of the status quo with regards to world access through, and continued Turkish sovereignty over, the shores of the Dardanelles, and ultimately to reinforce the U.S. commitment to Turkey. Accordingly, this deployment provided active suasion since with this gesture, the Turks ". . . felt free to reject Russian demands, acting on the assumption that they had found a new protector in the West.22 It probably was no accident that at the same time, the Soviets took diplomatic measures to reduce the strains of Soviet-Turkish relations, political demands for accommodation on border disputes, and the military threat against the contested Turkish provinces.

Naval suasion occurs only if it is perceived to be credible both in warfighting capability and as an embodiment of national resolve to resort to force if deemed necessary. Building credibility is a crucial aspect in translating that naval power into meaningful diplomatic currency.

BUILDING NAVAL CREDIBILITY

In wartime, naval power is measured through the act of combat, which serves as a definitive test of proficiency and provides data as to the accuracy of each side's assessment of the respective correlation of forces. In peacetime this testing process is not normally as severe or as descriptively accurate in providing this measurement. Instead it is assessed based on perceptions as to how belligerents would "measure up" in theoretical engagements. Since the result is intrinsically

subjective, there is necessarily a degree of uncertainty inherent in any such evaluation.

Another factor in the assessment problem concerns the loss of the image of omnipotence once intrinsic in the size of a vessel. The missile age has made small vessels extremely potent adversaries for large combatants while also enhancing the capabilities of shore emplacements and aircraft to successfully engage previously "invulnerable" naval vessels. This technology has been widely disseminated throughout the Third World; when coupled with sophisticated infrared technology and over-the-horizon radars, targeting considerably beyond the traditional three-mile limit of territorial waters is possible by many Third World countries.

One of the first signals of this trend was the 1967 Egyptian sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath by "styx" missile-armed patrol boats.23 In the Falkland Islands war, precision-guided munitions were further used in a war at sea, and in the Iran-Iraq Persian Gulf war, missiles have been used to interdict and intimidate the giant oil tankers transiting the Gulf and to virtually sink the Starke--by a single missile from a single plane. With the Beirut Marine Barracks truck-bomb incident, the obvious vulnerability of traditional symbols to suicidal terrorist attack has led to U.S. naval concern over a wide range of threats. These include suicide attack from "speedboat bombs," bomb-carrying ultra-light aircraft, and swimmers. The days are gone when naval warships can anchor a

mile offshore and threaten with impunity a city with their guns.24

A second aspect of the loss of omnipotence is a psychological one. How is the U.S. will to use military force perceived? Our pluralistic society, controversy-seeking media, and lack of congressional consensus concerning any use of military force, impacts on the perceived willingness of the U.S. to employ force. Certainly any use of force in an intervention role is sure to be debated, and, if the use is prolonged or results in collateral injuries/damage, to result in erosion of public support. Third World leaders are surely aware of this aspect of the American political character--our recent experiences in Vietnam and Lebanon would seem to support the belief that American intervention must be of a short duration if it is to be publically sustainable at home. Accordingly, a buildup of U.S. naval forces, though awesome perhaps in potential, is unlikely to result in the actual employment of force other than as a largely symbolic gestures like the 1986 strike on Libyan terrorist-related targets. The fact U.S. warships mass at virtually every crisis, but are rarely employed, erodes the veracity of the implied threat and thus the effectiveness of the naval presence as a means of applying "suasion."

In addition, naval presence for the purpose of suasion assumes a "rational actor model" for targeted decision-makers. The latent suasion of the naval force is based on its potential to cause "hurt," in the terminology of Thomas Schelling, to the

people of the nation, its military capability, or its industrial/economic base.[25] However, the leadership may not consider "the hurt" rationally as something to be avoided. Instead, U.S. inflicted violence may be seen as a means of maintaining personal power, promoting national prestige, or demonstrating a specific ideological stand. For example, Nicaragua's pre-election Sandanista regime might have benefited politically from U.S. "surgical" military actions against targets within Nicaragua since it would have added credibility and legitimacy to the regime's claims that the nation had to arm and prepare for an imminent U.S. invasion, thus legitimizing its oppressive internal consolidation of political power.[26] Likewise, Colombia, while urgently needing U.S. assistance to combat the drug cartels' threatened subversion of its governmental infrastructure, must still insist on the recognition of its sovereignty and the low profile of U.S. agencies and military forces--to specifically include the recent protest of a perceived U.S. intentions to blockade its coastlines with a U.S. fleet.[27] In Colombia's case, sovereignty and the appearance of independence from U.S. military control may be higher priorities than halting the drug trade which is threatening to destroy its national institutions.

Issues of sovereignty and international law are particularly relevant to the issue of naval suasion applied against transnational terrorist or drug-trafficking organizations vis-a-vis a specific nation-state. How can these organizations be attacked within a host nation without violating sovereignty or

the risk of unacceptable collateral damage? Any error in the use of force that results in injuries to nearby "civilians" or losses of U.S. personnel may result in a reassessment of a policy of using force, as fictionalized by Tom Clancy in his book Clear and Present Danger[28] regardless of how effective the action was in destroying the intended target. In addition, the use of force could involve violation of a host nation's sovereignty which may have serious implications in future diplomatic initiatives designed to eliminate support for terrorist organizations and the continued production of drugs for exportation to the U.S. In short, it is significantly more difficult to use naval forces as a means of asserting suasion against transnational terrorist and drug-trafficking organizations than it is against a nation-state.

SURVEILLANCE , ROUTINE PRESENCE, AND SHOWS OF FORCE

Forward naval presence performs three major functions: surveillance, routine presence, and shows of force. In the future, the focus of naval surveillance is likely to shift from the Soviet fleet to support of drug interdiction; the tremendous electronic surveillance capability of naval task forces will play an increasingly important part of closing down the major clandestine air and ocean surface smuggling routes. Routine presence reminds regional leaders of U.S. military reach and global interests, renews U.S. policy in regards to freedom of the seas, and maintains naval units forward-deployed in areas of future conflict. Routine presence ". . . includes those actions

conducted during regular deployments, primarily training exercises and port visits, while a show of force would be a specific deployment of naval forces that are planned in pursuit of an identifiable political objective . . ."29 or in response to a recognized crisis. In a crisis, naval forces involved in routine presence activities acquire a "diplomatic currency" for crisis resolution primarily through the nature of their response. If presence forces continue "business as usual" or sortie out of the region, it is a signal of U.S. lack of recognition of the crisis as a threat to U.S. interests and implies a lack of U.S. contingency planning for the use of naval force in resolving the crisis. When presence forces respond with increased readiness, changes in scheduled exercises or port calls, or redeploy, they become a signal of U.S. concern and recognition of the crisis.

The show of force is the primary naval instrument associated with the support of diplomatic initiatives in crisis resolution because it is a deliberate response (vis-a-vis presence or sorties out of the area which constitute passive naval responses). The show of force involves either the mobilization of naval forces in a threatening posture, the limited application of military force as a demonstration, or both. The keys to the success of a show of force are the projection of a viable and credible military threat that will: (1) demonstrate U.S. political resolve, (2) increase uncertainty for other involved protagonists, (3) assist in the U.S. maintenance of the initiative in the crisis resolution process, and (4) exercise escalation dominance. In short, the show of

force is the use of a naval force to threaten violence as a deliberate attempt at active suasion in support of U.S. policy and diplomatic initiatives.

PRUDENCE REQUIRES CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT

On 28 November 1984, during a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger introduced a list of six major tests for the use of U.S. combat forces.30 The list was a direct response to the terrorist bombing of the Marine compound in Beirut and reflects a realization by a top administration official that the way the U.S. has traditionally employed its military forces in times of crisis needs revision in view of today's new world conditions.

No longer is it possible to awe Third World nations through the employment of a naval task force in a crisis area or a few Marines deployed ashore to "bring order and enforce the laws of the land." Today the employment of naval diplomacy bears with it a number of physical and political risks which must be included in the calculus as to whether the employment of a naval show of force is a prudent measure in crisis management. Accordingly, just as Secretary Weinberger implicitly concludes that the use of force must be employed only as a last resort and only to protect vital interests, the naval instrument must be ordered to respond to a crisis for specific diplomatic purposes and not "just in case we need it," or because" that's what we always do."

Naval presence in response to a crisis, should no longer be automatic. It should be based on a clearly identified national interest of sufficient priority to warrant the risk to U.S. prestige and to the lives of U.S. servicemen if the forces employed are attacked. In this regard Weinberger's six major tests provide a prudent guide.

"The peaceful application of military force emphasizes non-use or the deterrent use of military power. This refers to implicit threats to resort to force."[31] A show of force or a naval presence in a crisis area provides this implicit threat. If challenged, it is virtually impossible to avoid having to respond with a demonstration of that force or risk a total loss of credibility. The Gulf of Sirte Incidents and Marine presence in Lebanon 1981-1982 are both examples that demonstrate a perceived challenge may be accepted. In the Gulf of Sirte Incidents, Qadhafi responded to the challenge to his nation's sovereignty over the Gulf up to his "line of death" with the symbolic sacrifice of three gunboats. In the case of the Marine contingent of the Multi-National Force, the Marines provided a symbolic target for terrorist "street Theater" that had a fundamental impact on U.S. foreign policy and subsequent role in the resolution of that crisis.

Accordingly, before deploying a force into a crisis theater, the NCA must balance the political risks of naval losses and what such losses will mean to U.S. consensus behind U.S. policy, and what escalatory measure the U.S. will be willing and able to implement. Escalation is probably more of an issue than

ever before because the naval forces are no longer seen as invulnerable. This is recognized by Richard Vlahos as one of the five potential causes of military confrontation with the Third World, through

> an act of "terrorism" directed at U.S. naval forces. This would be a military operation planned and supported by a Third World State. It would be run, however, by a "non-state team," making U.S. response difficult.[32]

Whether the attack was successful or not, the U.S. would be faced with virtually the same problem. How can the U.S. keep from escalating the crisis when it is virtually essential to forcefully retaliate to an attack on U.S. forces? To not respond to such an attack, particularly if against a U.S. aircraft carrier or battleship, would invite more attacks and significantly reduce the aura of inviolability and power that is one of the components of its diplomatic currency.

In addition, the naval presence must be perceived as politically and strategically warranted, because if attacked, the public, the Congress, and the media will either rally around the President's foreign policy or become universally critical of the decision to employ naval force. One of the best historical examples of an attack having a unifying affect was the destruction of the battle-cruiser Maine in Havana harbor that ignited the American public behind the U.S. Spanish-American War effort--even though the incident may or may not actually have been the result of Spanish agents.[33] In contrast, the terrorist attack against the Marine compound in Beirut demonstrated how losses of U.S. servicemen can fragment the

Congressional and public support for a policy. Solidification is only possible when the U.S. presence support clearly an articulated purpose and the loss can be seen as due to the perfidy of a recognized foe and not due to military incompetence or unrealistic Administration uses of military force for diplomatic purposes.

At the same time it should be an inherent part of U.S. policy that the U.S. will retaliate violently with all available means to any attack on U.S. military forces. Continued use of naval presence as a fundamental part of the Maritime Strategy requires it. Retaliation is necessary to reassert military credibility of U.S. forces--both within the region but also throughout the world. In addition, the U.S. may need to increase the size and potency of naval task forces used for naval presence missions. It may be prudent for the U.S. to employ multiple carrier battle groups in crisis response to ensure the capability exists for overwhelming retaliatory response.

> It is always best to employ more than sufficient force. The appearance of "overkill"--in the case of Libya, that amounted to three battle groups (in the Gulf of Sirte incidents). . . can in itself immobilize a Third World adversary, The long-term political capital with Third World states that the United States can accumulate by low-cost, flamboyant exercises like those in the Gulf of Sirte should not be underestimated. As Frederick the Great put it: "It is easier to crush 15,000 men than to beat 80,000, and you attain more or less the same result by risking less. By multiplying small successes you gradually heap up a treasure for yourself."34

Military successes are needed because a single loss can undermine all recent gains in military credibility. Use of naval

forces in support of diplomatic initiatives is most effective if it deters the actual use of force by the mere threat of violence. The use of overwhelming force is prudent in future uses of naval diplomacy to ensure success because failures can be disastrous.

In addition, the terrorist threat has changed the utility of naval forces in the role of peacekeepers. In the first decade of the 20th century, the U.S. Marines were used repeatedly to restore order and enforce cease fires within Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World. Since World War II, the conditions have changed. The power of the media to mold public opinion has established terrorism against peacekeeping forces as a guaranteed method for terrorists and sponsoring states to affect public policy within the U.S. The terrorist bombings of French and U.S. Marine compounds in Lebanon have shown how such acts of terrorism can destroy public consensus in support of foreign policy and force the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces. Whereas previously the local opposition groups were faced with only the option of fighting and winning against the Marines employed as peacekeepers, now winning militarily is not as important as using violence against these forces to symbolically demonstrate strength and discredit U.S. policies and forces. Today, U.S. ground forces as peacekeepers no longer have the utility they once did and may actually act as an escalatory influence on crises. Accordingly, the NCA may be better served by encouraging the use of ground forces from nations with a more neutral and lower world profile than the U.S. and its major allies in

peacekeeping missions. In this regard, forces from traditionally neutral nations such as Switzerland and under the auspices of a world organization such as the United Nations may be essential components of peacekeeping efforts.

RETALIATION

In the struggle to develop a viable, coherent strategy to combat state-supported terrorism and drug trafficking, retaliation necessarily plays a major role. In virtually all the academic literature that develops a proposal for comprehensive U.S. policy against terrorism contains this requirement in one form or another and under certain conditions. For example, B. Hugh Tovar indicates that, "selective use of force against terrorism is imperative if the United States is to be taken seriously. Its purpose--to halt terrorist attacks--must supplement diplomatic and other actions aimed at solving the more complex issues of which terrorism is an extreme manifestation."[35] Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is even more emphatic, stating, "the willingness to use force credibly is indispensable to efforts to combat terrorism, for otherwise the deterrent capacity of the United States will be ineffective."[36] Alvin H. Bernstein reflects this same theme in his proposed U.S. strategy of response to a terrorist attack through "an exploitation of its military strength, following its tradition of retaliation--counter-punching, if you will. Americans identify

with a reluctant hero, who hesitating to strap on his six-shooter, finally realizes that he has no choice."[37]

This philosophy was articulated in the 1984 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138 that "endorses the principle of preemptive strikes in addition to reprisal raids against terrorists abroad."[38] This reflects a "get-tough" philosophy that underpinned the Reagan Administration's approach to state-sponsored terrorism and appears to be just as applicable to that of the Bush Administration in the parallel "wars" on terrorism and drug trafficking. It reflects a principle of armed response that has been turned into deeds in both the Libyan Raid and the 1988 retaliatory raids in the Persian Gulf that resulted in the sinking of a significant percentage of the Iranian Navy and the destruction of two oil platforms, but has not been universally applied due to a number of technical, political, and ethical problems.

The technical problems are solvable. The U.S. military has the capability to effectively carry out retaliatory/reprisal responses. The forward-deployed naval forces that are the focus of the nation's Maritime Strategy are singularly well-placed to play a major role in carrying out a reprisal strategy. To be effective in this role they must be equipped and prepared specifically for this mission. Historically in the post World War II years, the Navy has resisted having its forward-deployed forces earmarked for specific contingency missions:

> Wary of having its carrier battle groups linked to the anathema of limited war in the Third World, the Navy went so far in the 1970's as to reject publicly the whole doctrine for such contingencies. The use

> of carriers in limited engagements was held as an unstated Navy option, one which a fleet, acquired for "high intensity" combat against the Soviet Union, could master with ease and without preparation.39

However, effective retaliatory raids and contingency operations against terrorists, the drug cartels, and their supporting nation-states require preparation and contingency planning. Elements of the Fleets operating in the Eastern Mediterranean, North Arabian Sea, and in support of drug interdiction operations within the Western Hemisphere should have as a primary mission the preparation for such a role. This should include: (1) advanced targeting for retaliatory strikes --with preprogrammed TLAM-C guidance programs aboard designated ships, (2) preplanned air strikes awaiting the command to execute, and (3) preplanned targets for MEU(SOC)s to conduct on order. In addition, contingency plans for mining and blockade operations should be developed, rehearsed, and the necessary munitions and support equipment forward-deployed in the theaters of the major sponsoring states of terrorism and drug trafficking. Finally, this retaliatory function should be embraced by the Navy as an integral part of strike warfare within the Maritime Strategy.

However, no matter what technical preparations are made, the military strategy for the use of force must be fully integrated into the diplomatic and political programs of our National Security Strategy. To warrant the risks of crisis escalation--to specifically include terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and property worldwide--the retaliatory strikes must be: (1) proportional, (2) appropriate, and (3) successful.

In addition, it should be anticipated that reprisals may have to be repeated to clearly demonstrate U.S. resolve.

> A one-time strike against terrorists will not (necessarily) deter future attacks; rather, it will encourage them. Therefore, U.S. policy-makers should not expect an early end to terrorist attacks and should be visibly determined to retain a policy of selective military strikes well into the next decade.40

Accordingly, a protracted "war" is likely that would entail multiple strikes over a period of time and will be a test of U.S. political resolve, public consensus, and military capability. This potential war would require the U.S. to demonstrate both the ability to deny the terrorists and drug traffickers their underlying purpose while also deterring future attacks. The recovery of hostages and retaliation/reprisal are the military functions within such a strategy.

Alvin Bernstein proposes that such a strategy could be effective in dealing with a nation sponsoring terrorist acts if the U.S. would recognize it was at war and prepare accordingly for the hard decisions that entails. For example, he proposes that the U.S. establish as policy "instantaneous retaliation" whenever a U.S. citizen is killed or kidnapped. He suggests immediate reprisal strikes should be linked with simultaneous rescue attempts. He proposes seeking targets that "will involve few, if any, civilian casualties--targets whose destruction will not trigger the adverse reaction that the Administration and U.S. military leaders so fear and that is a crucial ingredient in the terrorists' strategy."41 He suggests the U.S. look first to targets outside of a host or sponsoring nation such as arms

shipments, patrol boats, and reconnaissance aircraft. If the conflict escalates, a second phase of reprisal towards naval port facilities, airfields, or other industrial resources that support the nation's military would be suitable.[42] A similar strategy against the drug cartels may be feasible, with or without host nation support if the cartels resort to violence against U.S. agencies and specifically military forces involved in drug interdiction. In any such strategy the Navy would necessarily play a major role--one that it is singularly well suited to perform. However, from the outset, the U.S. decision-maker must be prepared for losses and to escalate to whatever level of violence is necessary to maintain escalation dominance and compel an end to violence in conjunction with a foreign policy that integrates all of the instruments of national policy into a coherent strategy.

CONCLUSION

Changes in the international and domestic security environments have changed the role of naval presence in U.S. strategy. Decreased naval assets and the ability of deployed naval forces to fundamentally change the balance of power in a given region have degraded the ability of routine presence to effectively accomplish U.S. diplomatic objectives through "latent suasion." Routine presence in regions of major or vital U.S. interest will change to "random presence" with intermittent "gaps" in what heretofore had been continuous presence to conduct

"flex ops" in other areas. As and example of random presence, Admiral Trost recently indicated that a ". . . carrier battle group might leave an area say, the Mediterranean, for a short time to exercise in the Norwegian Sea, and then return."[43] As a result of the decline in routine presence and opportunities for "latent suasion," the show of force will become of even greater importance in naval diplomacy because of a corresponding increase in emphasis on effecting "active suasion" to accomplish naval diplomacy objectives.

The naval instrument still has viability in supporting U.S. diplomatic initiatives. However, it must be used in responding to crises with restraint and forethought. Dispatch of naval task forces as a routine response to crises or Marines as peacekeepers must be tempered by restraint unless some distinct diplomatic purpose is intended that is important enough to put these forces at risk. The use of naval forces for surveillance in support of drug interdiction may attract violent reaction from drug cartels that must be planned for in a policy of retaliation.

It's a dangerously lethal world, one in which the U.S. can be bloodied by numerous sources other than the Soviet Union. It is also one in which causing U.S. military losses is a recognized way to strike back at U.S. policies. Accordingly, the day of diplomatic success in resolving crises due to a simple naval presence has probably set--though the utility of the naval instrument to inflict measured violence in support of U.S. diplomatic efforts has never been greater. The President will continue to look to the naval instrument as his force of choice

in carrying out future "tough-line" foreign policies, but increasingly with the knowledge that the emerging international environment contains a growing potential for violent challenges to U.S. naval presence.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomas H. Etzold, "Neither Peace Nor War: Employing Naval Forces Short Of General War," Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, Ed: Lt Col David J. Dean, (Maxwell AFB, Al.: Air University Press, 1986), p. 272.

2. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces As a Political Instrument, pp. 37-41, lists only three major advantages: "mobility," "flexibility," and "tradition or habit." The more definitive list of seven advantages or "assets" is paraphrased from K(en) Booth's Navies and Foreign Policy (New York: Crane, Russak Publishers, 1977), pp. 32-36.

3. Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces As a Political Instrument, pp. 23-57.

4. Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War, 1975-1982," Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1984, pp. 33-34.

5. This issue is discussed by Dennis M. Pricolo in Naval Presence and Cold War Foreign Policy: A study of the Discussion to Station the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, 1945-1958, (Cameron Station, Alexandria, Va: Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Technical Information Center, 1978), p. 97. As an example, when the carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt deployed on a presence mission into the Mediterranean Sea shortly after World War II, her air wing was larger and/or more advanced than almost all of the air forces of the nations on the Mediterranean littoral combined! Today's carriers typically have 60-75 high-performance aircraft (attack and fighters), but no longer match the national air forces of potential belligerants. ISSI's The World Military Balance 1988-1989 (London: Brassey's Press, 1989), pp. 99, 107-108, and 115, provide the following examples: Egypt--517 combat airccraft, 70 armed helicopters, and 9 Tupolev TU-16 bombers; Libya--some 531 combat aircraft (including 4 TU-22 bombers) and 16 armed helicopters, thought to be flown by Syrian pilots, with Pakistani and North Korean instructor pilots; and Syria--499 combat aircraft and an additonal 110 or more armmed helicopters. In each case, national air forces include front-line fighter/interceptors such as the MIG-23, MIG-25, MIG-27, and MIG-31.

6. See The Report of the Commission on an Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, 11 January 1988, or National Security Research Report, "Possible Changes in the International Distribution of Power; Trends and Implications for the Navy," unpublished, July 1989, pp. 1-53.

7. William M. Arkin, "Our Risky Naval Strategy Could Get Us All Killed," Washington Post, p. C-1, and "Troubled Waters: The Navy's Aggressive War Strategy," Technology Review, January 1989, p. 54.

8. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990) p. 3.

9. Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Supplement, January 1986, pp. 6-7.

10. William S. Lind, "The Maritime Strategy--1988...Bad Strategy?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1988, p. 54, and Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982, pp. 1124-1144.

11. James C Irwin, "DOD Now Becoming a Major Player in National Undertaking," The Almanac of Seapower: 1990, Navy League of the United States, January 1990, p. 75.

12. CDR Ralf E. Arnott and CDR William A, Gaffney, "Naval Presence: Sizing the Force," Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, p. 18.

13. Sir James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1986, p. 338. It should be noted that Cable goes on to state specifically "naval movements, visits, and exercises are not gunboat diplomacy if nobody regards them as threatening." He describes gunboat diplomacy as "definitive," "purposeful," "catalytic," and "expressive" force, that seems to intermingle functional and intensity criteria. Although his analysis is explicitly based on the supposed overall intent of the naval power that is exerting the naval force, he is not inconsistent with Edward N. Luttwak's views. Both seem to be discussing the same phemomena though from opposite perspectives. In Luttwak's perspective of the "effect" of the action, only the routine presence that does have an effect on a target nation is automatically considered under the definition of gunboat diplomacy.

14. Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) p. 6.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 11.

17. Etzold, "Neither Peace Nor War: Employing Naval Forces Short of General War," p. 277.

18. Luttwak, Political Uses of Seapower, p. 13.

19. Ibid., pp. 18-19

20. LCDR Kenneth R. McGruther, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, pp. 4-9. Note: Superficially a case could be made that the U.S. carrier battle group "actively suaded" the Soviet Union to remain neutral; however, no evidence that the Soviet Union had either the interest or the capability to interfere can be identified, nor that the existence of the single carrier battle group had any effect on Soviet decisions. McGruther hypothesizes from Kissenger's comments that the deployment was a "token" reminder of U.S. commitment to peace and U.S. support of Pakistan and an intentionally vague action that "left it to each nation to draw its own conclusions about American motivations and trusted them to view the situation in the light of their own world view."

21. Maj Thomas C. Linn, " Military Power Short of War," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1986, p. 75.

22. Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea Power, p. 43.

23. Ibid., p. 13.

24. The difference in the relative strength of the Third World vis-a-vis the "great naval powers" is clearly evident in an anecdote contained in Anne Cipriano Vengon's "Gunboat Diplomacy in the Med," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Supplement 1985, pp. 26-31. She describes an incident that occurred in Beirut in the summer of 1903: "(O)n 24 August, as the American Vice-Consul, William C, Magelssen (was being driven by coach home from dinner) . . . his coach passed a well-lit corner near (the Italian Consul's) home, an assailant fired a single shot at the dozing consul. By the time the driver regained control of the startled horses, they were several blocks from the scene . . ." Magelssen was unhurt but incensed by the incident and that the police dismissed the incident because a 15 year old boy who had ". . . allegedly fired his revolver in the air in the traditional fere de joie after a wedding. . ." Magelssen unleashed a series of protests which resulted in President Roosevelt dispatching two cruisers (the Brooklyn and the San Francisco) to the area. Over the next few months the two cruisers anchored off Beirut and were instrumental in forcing a change in the Ottoman regime in the city, a reorganization of the police force, and a change in the general climate before chaos and religious strife enveloped the city. The difference between Lebanon in 1904 when two U.S. cruisers had overwhelming local power to force a city/empire to take action over a few shots in the air, vis-a-vis the U.S. virtual impotence in 1983 in the same region with a multi-carrier task force in the wake of the Beirut bombing, is striking.

25. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Violence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) p. 3.

26. Edward A. Lynch, "International Terrorism: The Search for a Policy," Terrorism: An International Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1987, pp. 65-66.

27. James Longo, "Pentagon to Deploy More Ships, Aircraft to Fight Drug War," Navy Times, 19 March 90, pp. 3 and 10, and Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush May Revive Plan for Warships Off Colombia," New York Times, 14 February 1990, p. A7.

28. Tom Clancy, Clear and Present Danger (New York: Putnam and Sons, 1989).

29. Arnott and Gaffney, "Naval Presence: Sizing the Force," pp. 18-19.

30. Richard H. Shultz Jr., "Can Democratic Governments Use Military Force in the War Against Terrorism? The U.S. Confrontation With Libya," World Affairs, Spring 1986, pp. 206-207, and Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power, "OASD (Public Affairs) News Release No. 608-84 containing the transcript of remarks prepared for delivery to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984.

31. Richard H. Shultz, "Can Democratic Governments Use Military Force in the War Against Terrorism? The U.S. Confrontation With Libya," p. 206.

32. Michael Vlahos, "The Third World in U.S. Naval Planning." Orbis, Spring 1986, p. 137.

33. According to Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936), pp. 330-331. The Maine was destroyed "while lying quietly at her moorings on the night of February 15th with no preliminary circumstances to excite the least alarm or suspicion . . . . The incident precipitated the most acute tension in the already strained political relations between Spain and the United States, and throughout the latter there was an insistent clamor in favor of war." An investigation at the time, and confirmed following the war when the Maine was raised, indicated that the explosion was due to a "submarine mine which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines." However, no evidence has ever been found as to the nature of the alleged mine or who was responsible for placing it. The assumption by the American "yellow press" and generally accepted by the American public and U.S. Congress was that the Spanish government was responsible, which led to the slogan "Remember the Maine!" that galvanized Americans in support of U.S. aggressive policy toward Spain in the ensuing Spanish-American War.

34. Vlahos, "The Third World in U.S. Naval Planning," p. 137. The quote of Frederick the Great is from Christopher Duffy, The Military Life Of Frederick the Great (New York: Atheneum, 1986), p. 263.

35. Uri Ra'anan et al., Hydra of Carnage: The International Linkages of Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations, The Witnesses Speak (Lexington/Toronto: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1986), p. 241.

36. Ibid., p. 299.

37. Alvin H. Bernstein, "Iran's Low-Intensity War Against the United States," Orbis, Spring 1986, p. 159.

38. Col James B. Motley, "Terrorist Warfare: A Reassessment," Military Review, June 1985, p. 50.

39. Vlahos, "The Third World in U.S. Naval Planning," p. 145.

40. Lynch, "International Terrorism: The Search for a Policy," p. 32.

41. Bernstein, "Iran's Low-Intensity War Against the United States," p. 165.

42. Ibid., p. 166.

43. Charles W. Corddry, "Navy Likely to be Service of Choice in Lean-Budget Times," The Almanac of Seapower: 1990, Navy League of the United States, January 1990, p. 7.